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Abstract 
Electronic systems are prone to failures, whether during manufacture or throughout their in-
service lifetime. A number of design and fabrication techniques are presently employed that 
maintain an economical production yield. However the cost of though-life maintenance and 
fault mitigation operations for complex, high-value systems remains a major challenge and 
requires new design methods in order to increase their resilience. In this paper the focus is on 
applications that are sensitive to transient random errors caused by single event upsets and 
multiple bit upsets occurring within their electronic systems and sub-systems, as well as 
applications that benefit from fault detection and localisation. A novel self-restoration strategy 
is proposed based on a two-layer design approach comprising a fault-tolerant coordination 
layer with convergent cellular automata (CCA) and a configurable functional logic layer. This 
design strategy is able to self-reconstruct the correct functional logic configuration in the event 
of transient faults without external intervention. The necessary CCA rule set and state table 
sizes for 3x3 and 4x4 binary coded patterns are analysed in order to estimate the generic 
resource requirements for larger designs. Additionally, the possibility of exploiting the design 
for built-in fault detection and diagnostic reporting is investigated. 
Keywords: Design for self-repair, self-configuration, resilient electronics, cellular automata, 
single event upset, multiple bit upset. 
1 Introduction 
The maintenance and repair of high-value systems is costly and in many cases requires 
significant investment at the design phase in order to limit the cost of through-life support. At 
the same time, there is a growing need for increased reliability and availability of mission-
critical electronics for avionics, ground transport vehicles and robotics for nuclear inspection or 
space exploration. While there is a continuing desire within the electronic systems domain 
towards the use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) electronic components, even for mission 
critical systems such as space and avionics, such components are expected to fail more 
frequently in future due to the increasing influence of transient random single error events 
(SEEs) [1]. This is especially true of integrated circuits (ICs) subjected to high energy radiation 
particles such as neutrons, where the conventional solution has been to adopt expensive 
radiation-hardened ICs. New design strategies for self-diagnosis and self-recovery in 
engineering systems will open up new opportunities for reducing the overall through-life cost 
of complex systems and has therefore become an area of considerable interest in recent years 
[2]. The related concept of autonomous maintenance also seeks to reduce the total life cost 
(TLC) of high-value systems [3] by reducing the need for expensive repair, overhaul and fault-
finding. 
In this paper the particular problem of transient upsets arising from randomly induced faults is 
considered, which have the capacity to produce transient fault events within ICs. This is of 
particular importance due to the presence of integrated electronic systems and sub-systems 
within most complex engineering systems. A number of different faults may manifest as a 
result of SEEs due to neutron and proton particle interactions [4], each of which may lead to 
errors and unexpected behaviour. A common occurrence is that of one or more bit-flips 
occurring within internal logic gates or memory cells, leading to a single event upset (SEU) or 
multiple bit upset (MBU). Such events threaten the integrity and trustworthiness of the 
electronic system. These scenarios have been studied extensively for high-altitude flight and 
space applications but SEUs have been also observed in ground-based computing systems with 
large-area memory arrays [5] and are of growing concern for embedded systems due to the 
ever-diminishing transistor size [6]. Of particular prominence is the use of COTS components 
for SEU-sensitive avionics in commercial airliners, military aircraft and autonomous craft [7]. 
Further relevant applications include biomedical devices, mission critical industrial and nuclear 
process control systems and safety/security-oriented consumer products such as automobiles 
and smart card payment systems. 
A variety of hardware strategies have been proposed that aim to bring increased resilience 
against SEE (and in some cases permanent faults) while attempting to minimising the resource 
overhead. Provision for MBU usually requires far more complex design than for SEU in order to 
meet the necessary fault capacity. On-chip memory is particularly vulnerable to MBU due to its 
dense structure [8], but combinatorial logic cells are also at risk since faults induced by upsets 
may propagate to multiple registers. Of particular note are present-day FPGA devices that 
contain large quantities of embedded SRAM where there is a growing interest in “design for 
reliability” strategies that encompass functional diversity, modular redundancy, fine-grained 
fault tolerant design and autonomous self-repair [9]. New design approaches are needed for 
custom logic, for which data error detection and correction (EDC) strategies such as two-
dimensional hamming codes or fault tolerant logic are typically applied. Figure 1 illustrates 
three examples of fine-grained logic redundancy strategies that have been proposed. Future 
nanoscale logic will require fine-grained design strategies to improve their manufacturing yield 
[10], for which quadded logic [11] and temporal redundancy [12] architectures have been 
proposed. 
  
Figure 1 Existing fault tolerant hardware logic designs. From left to right: triple modulo 
redundancy with voter [10]; quadded logic [11]; series / parallel redundancy in CMOS logic 
[12]. 
 
The most prolific strategies for error tolerance in reconfigurable platforms are based on 
configuration scrubbing. This involves reloading a “golden” configuration bitstream, either 
upon detection of an error, or else performed periodically [13]. Periodic scrubbing is also 
combined with other fault-tolerant strategies [14] but their use is energy-intensive and leads 
to unnecessary reconfigurations when no upsets have occurred.  Explicit fault detection is 
challenging due to the transient nature of many types of SEU-induced errors, and in some 
cases the error state may be present for some time before being detected. A number of 
existing self-repair strategies are capable of detecting and eliminating faults that accumulate 
sequentially over time [15], but a major compromise is the need for explicit fault detection and 
repair logic that requires considerable resource overhead. These strategies also rely upon 
effective discrimination between transient and permanent faults in order to avoid triggering 
unnecessary reconfigurations in the event of transient upsets (and thus potentially wasting 
valuable resources).  
This paper presents an alternative design strategy that is based upon a self-recovering 
algorithm able to protect data patterns and logic configurations from SEU and MBU by 
continually refreshing the correct pattern at a fine-grained level.  Redundancy is applied in the 
form of information stored within the elements of a cellular automaton (CA), which in turn 
creates a stable logic configuration that is highly resilient. This work is therefore distinct from 
previous work in that external error detection is not required: any deviations from the correct 
configuration pattern are immediately addressed by the internal cellular architecture and its 
regenerative behaviour. This strategy is further able to recover in the extreme case of an upset 
occurring simultaneously within every bit of the configuration pattern, provided permanent 
damage does not occur.  
 
2 Design framework 
In order to achieve resilience at the logic design level, a simple CA layer is utilised whose 
purpose is to protect the critical configuration of the functional logic.  Functional logic is 
arranged as a functional component layer and is represented here by a regular array of 
configurable logic cells whose configuration is dictated by the CA pattern. This is analogous to 
the concept of configuring FPGA chips vis data bitstreams. However caution is needed when 
drawing this analogy because the architecture of current FPGA chips is not optimised for fine-
grained online reconfiguration, and indeed self-repair strategies that seek to achieve online 
configuration are highly complex and reply upon sophisticated coordination. An example of 
this is the STAR algorithm [16], in which a reconfiguration process continuously searches for 
and isolates faulty logic. Another example is the SABRE project [17] that utilises a custom ASIC 
design manufactured specifically for fine-grained reconfiguration. The architecture allows 
configurations to be implemented that are derived from complex evolutionary algorithms that 
seek to generate alternative configurations in the event of faults occurring within the 
hardware. The SABRE architecture uses parity EDC to protect against soft errors occurring 
within cells, with ‘gene’ code being reloaded when necessary. This is similar in principle to data 
scrubbing in FPGAs but at a fine-grained level. Reloading is done in two parts: hard errors are 
dealt with by the reconfiguration scheme where cells are shifted, while error codes are applied 
to the hard-fault tolerance architecture via parity distributed within processor cells. Thus, data 
EDC occurs independently within each ‘cell’ or control logic unit rather than being combined 
between neighbouring cells. Furthermore, the sMOVE processor may be regarded as a 
governing process that monitors the status of all cells. In this paper, a decentralised approach 
is proposed for detecting  errors within the configuration using a self-restoring cellular array 
that is continually driven towards a pre-defined pattern. If this pattern can be arranged to 
represent the configuration of the functional components (and can be re-generated should the 
pattern configuration become altered) then the logic configuration is repeatedly protected 
against transient upset events. In order to achieve the necessary regenerative property, rule 
sets are deterministically pre-computed by an algorithm rather than via evolution/mutation. 
The resulting Convergent CA (CCA) is considered to be a highly resilient pattern generator that 
protects the logic configuration by continuously enforcing its rule set. This design layer is 
referred to as the fault-tolerant coordination layer. CAs have also been proposed for 
protecting against node failures in multi-processor arrays including extension to two-
dimensional topologies [18]. In this case entire processing units are disabled in the event of a 
fault being detected and a reconfiguration of process scheduling occurs that is coordinated by 
the CA. A comparison of similar strategies was provided in [19] where, again, the subjects were 
processors and permanent faults were handled by reconfiguration. 
Continuing the analogy with COTS FPGA technology, a CCA design can be regarded as a two-
dimensional bitstream generator that is protected by the rule and state mapping solutions, 
and which in turn maintains the FPGA’s configurable logic block (CLB) configuration. There are 
many ways in which to arrange the functional component layer that is coordinated (and 
protected) by the fault-tolerant coordination layer: here a two-dimensional grid geometry is 
chosen. Figure 2 illustrates the arrangement between functional and fault-tolerant layers, 
where a direct correspondence between each CCA cell and associated configurable functional 
block is established. The size of the required CCA is dependent upon the granularity of the 
functional design i.e., how it is broken down at the logic design stage. A related concept has 
been proposed in the form of the Plastic Cell architecture [20] that also operates at fine-
grained cellular logic design level. Indeed, this approach is similarly built upon a two-plane 
architecture using a coordinator layer (referred to as built-in logic) and configurable layer 
(referred to as plastic logic), though the actual governing mechanism is somewhat different to 
that proposed here. 
 
Figure 2 Illustration of resilient logic as a two-layer logic design incorporating a fault-tolerant 
coordination layer (comprising the CCA) and functional component layer above. Each functional 
component may adopt various configurations controlled by the state of the coordination layer. Three 
examples of functional logic component configurations are illustrated on the right. 
 
2.1 Properties of the functional logic layer 
The functional component layer forms an actual logic unit that becomes part of the active 
electronics. A design is shown in Figure 3 that implements a full adder logic unit design that 
can be cascaded [21].  In order to configure the functional component layer, each cell is 
coordinated by the value of a CCA cell that directly asserts the correct logic function from a set 
of available configurations. Previous designs have focused on feed-forward circuits, whose 
interconnect structure ensures that data paths do not cross and feed in from left to right or 
top to bottom, ensuring that the data flow between logic blocks mimics that of the CCA itself.  
In the example shown, the associated CCA states are indicated in square brackets within each 
logic cell. 
 Figure 3 Example configuration of functional logic layer that forms a single-bit full adder logic unit. Each 
cell has been configured from one of a set of available pre-defined logic configurations. CCA numerical 
states for this design are indicated in square brackets. For reference the equivalent standard logic design 
is also shown. 
2.2 Properties of the fault-tolerant coordination layer 
The concept of self-configuring patterns arises from the CCA design and is composed of an 
array of cells, each capable of performing simple computational tasks. Interactions occur 
between neighbouring cells that are governed by a common rule set. The resulting behaviour 
displayed by the CCA is dependent upon the rules used, boundary values and the allowable 
flow of nearest-neighbour signals. Fault detection is not explicit; individual cells continually 
update their state depending upon the state of their immediate neighbours, effecting a 
continuous replenishment of the global pattern. 
Considering a generalised two-dimensional CA, such as that illustrated in Figure 4, each cell 
obeys the same rule set stored in look-up table (LUT) form, which determines the next-state of 
the cell in response to the values of neighbouring cells. In some limited cases, the rule set may 
create patterns that become static i.e., they no longer change after a certain number of time 
steps have elapsed. This particular situation can be exploited for robust design since the CA 
continually replenishes the static pattern even when one or more cells are disturbed. In 
previous work [22] a set of conditions was proposed that achieves this behaviour for any target 
pattern and examples rulesets were derived. An analysis of classical two-dimensional cellular 
automata showed that, by restricting the flow of inter-cell communications to that of 
unidirectional signal flow and between neighbours from the north and west or from the south 
and east, a rule set may be derived that produces a stable steady-state pattern that is 
independent of the initial state of the CA. This restriction is illustrated in Figure 4 by the 
indicated directions of signal inputs and outputs. The resulting CCA is able to reassert the 
pattern in the event that it is forced to deviate from its intended state. Reconstruction occurs 
within a predictable number of discrete-time steps.  
 
Figure 4 Structure of two-dimensional cellular automata, showing boundary cells, pattern cells, signal 
flow of intra-cell inputs (I1, I2) and outputs (O), and basic structure of rule look-up table. 
 
3 CCA design strategy 
In this section a brief description of the design approach for generating CCA rule sets is 
described. For full details of the approach, the reader is referred to previous literature [23]. 
Referring once again to Figure 4, derivation of an efficient rule set for a given target pattern 
proceeds by direct inspection of the pattern and boundary cell values. It is also important that 
all derived rules must be unique. Referring again to Figure 4, each rule is composed of the 
tuple [I1, I2, O], noting that the present value of each cell is not included within the rule itself.  
3.1 Mitigation strategy for rule conflicts  
Each rule stored within the LUT must contain a unique mapping. A many-to-one rule conflict 
occurs when different next state values arise from the same input values. For example, the 
rules (0,0,1) and (0,0,0) are non-unique. State conflicts are common, especially when the CCA 
pattern is encoded with a restricted number base. The above example rule conflict could be 
settled by incrementing the state value of one of the neighbouring state cells e.g., (0,2,1), 
(0,0,0), assuming the state ‘2’ is the next available unallocated state. The correct output value 
is retrieved by an additional state mapping LUT. Care is needed with this approach because 
state substitutions may generate further rule conflicts and hence an iterative algorithm is 
needed. 
A procedure for eliminating state conflicts is presented in Figure 5 using a state increment 
strategy based on a modified version of that described in [23]. The algorithm is designed to 
detect the presence of boundary cells, which are assumed to be fixed, and hence either north 
or west cell states may be incremented. In the rare case of a rule conflict being attributed to 
the top-left cell (where neither west nor north cell can be altered), the cell attributed to the 
second rule conflict is instead incremented.  
 Figure 5 Flow diagram of algorithm used to resolve rule conflicts. 
 
4 LUT resource requirements 
In order to quantify the LUT resource overhead, a detailed study of the rule size for a large 
number of different binary target patterns was carried out. Beginning with 3x3 CCA patterns, 
every possible combination was examined (i.e., 2^9 patterns) and a minimal rule set generated 
according the method described in Section 3. To better understand the influence of the 
boundary cell values on the resource overhead, the design requirements for each CCA pattern 
were assessed using three sample boundary sets as detailed in Table 1. Boundary set 1 is a 
simple zero boundary pattern requiring the simplest logic in order to assert logic ‘0’ at 
boundary cells. Boundary set 2 increases the information contained in the boundary set to 
base 4, requiring 2 bit lines to encode the values {0,1,2,3}. Boundary set 3 further increases the 
information to base 6, requiring 3 bit lines. This final set is arranged such that values in the 
boundary cells become decoupled from CCA cell values with the aim of decreasing the number 
of rule conflicts and additional states required to solve the CCA rule set. 
Table 1 Boundary cell values used 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Analysis of 3x3 patterns 
The number of additional states introduced in order to resolve rule conflicts is an important 
measure of the necessary design complexity. A large number of additional states will require 
more bit lines to encode state information between neighbouring cells, leading to higher 
interconnect density. For each of the boundary sets every 3x3 CCA pattern was solved, rule 
conflicts resolved and the necessary number of states aggregated. Figure 6 shows the resulting 
histogram distribution for each boundary set. For boundary sets 1 & 2, certain patterns require 
3 intra-cell bit lines to handle up to 8 states. In contrast, the values used in boundary set 3 are 
sufficiently decoupled from the pattern state values that the number of states is contained 
between the range (1...4), enabling the use of 2 intra-cell bit lines. 
 Top border cells Right border cells Number of bits 
Boundary set 1 [0 0 0] [0 0 0] 1 
Boundary set 2 [3 2 1] [1 2 3] 2 
Boundary set 3 [6 5 4] [4 5 6] 3 
  
Figure 6 Number of CCA states for 3x3 target patterns. Left: Histogram distributions of number of states 
required for CCA encoding for 3x3 binary patterns (including rule conflict resolution) and using different 
boundary cell values. Right: Mean number of states needed to encode 3x3 patterns for each boundary 
set. 
 
 
The number of rule conflicts encountered for each target pattern is summarised in Figure 7, 
which provides a measure of the effectiveness of each boundary cell set. Both boundary sets 2 
& 3 result in two or more conflicts for some patterns, however conflicts are resolved more 
efficiently for boundary set 3. 
  
Figure 7 Number of conflicts resulting from each pattern. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the number of rules required for each pattern, which dictates the size of the 
LUT in each cell. In contrast to the number of states, the choice of boundary set does not 
greatly influence the number of rules required to resolve conflicts suggesting that the rule set 
is not easily compressible. 
 Figure 8 Number of rules required to resolve rule conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the variation in state mappings for each boundary set, which determines 
the size of the state map LUT. In contrast to the rule set, the number of state mappings is 
highly dependent upon the pattern and boundary conditions. It is seen that the size of this LUT 
varies between 0 and 6 entries and for boundary set 3 does not exceed 2 entries. 
 Figure 9 Number of state mappings required to resolve rule conflicts. 
 
4.2 Analysis of 4x4 patterns 
To further investigate how the above parameters scale with CCA pattern size, the procedure 
described above was repeated for all 4x4 patterns (i.e., 2^16 combinations). For this case two 
boundary sets were used as detailed in Table 2. The resulting mean number of rules, states 
and state mappings are summarised in Table 3 along with their standard deviation. Significant 
reductions result from using the more complex boundary set 5 with similar standard deviation. 
Histogram data is again presented for this boundary set (Figure 10), where once more it is seen 
that the number of rules is biased towards the right hand side of the distribution. For this 
larger sample set, both the number of rules and state mappings appear to acquire a Gaussian-
shaped profile. It can also been seen from the graphical results that at least 3 bit lines are 
needed for intra cell communications and in many cases 4 bit lines are required – less than 
that required for the boundary cell values. A trade-off does however exists in terms of the size 
of the rule/state mapping LUTs: referring again to Figure 10, it is evident that for some 
patterns there are no additional state mappings required. However these particular patterns 
require the highest number of rules and therefore a largest LUTs. 
 
Table 2 Boundary sets used for 4x4 CCA patterns. 
 Top border cells Right border cells Number of bits 
Boundary set 4 [0 0 0 0] [0 0 0 0] 1 
Boundary set 5 [4 5 6 7] [7 6 5 4] 3 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Distributions of results for calculated for 4x4 patterns and boundary set 5. 
 
Table 3 Statistical results for 4x4 patterns. SD = Standard deviation. 
  Boundary set 4 Boundary set 5 
Number of rules 
Mean 15.3 14.83 
SD 1.05 1.27 
Number of states 
Mean 8.01 4.52 
SD 0.99 1.41 
Number of state 
mappings 
Mean 7.01 3.48 
SD 0.99 1.38 
 
4.3 Conditions for self-configuration and recovery 
Self-recovery requires that rule set is correct (and can be relied upon) and that the boundary 
values are correct. An example of the self-restoring property is illustrated in Figure 11, where 
the initially correct pattern is disturbed and rebuilds by reasserting the correct cell state. 
 
Figure 11 Example of self-restoring of pattern following multiple upset. Cells affected by upsets are 
shown shaded. This particular pattern requires 15 rules. 
 
Clearly the LUT contents within each cell must be valid in order for the correct pattern to 
emerge. In the event of SEU/MBU occurring within a LUT the error condition may clear by 
itself, in which case the correct pattern will re-emerge. If the error does not clear then re-
assertion of the correct LUT contents becomes necessary. Strategies based upon either mutual 
self-checking between neighbouring cells, or else the use of global LUTs with redundancy 
would likely form effective protection. In the former case, each cell periodically checks the 
contents of its own rule and state LUTs for consistency with those of its nearest neighbours, 
thus retaining the cellular design concept. In the latter case, the rule and state LUTs are 
instead stored centrally and protected by standard triple modular redundancy (TMR) or similar 
approach. Central LUT storage requires fewer LUT memory cells but significantly higher 
interconnect density between cells. A key design consideration here is the effective radiation 
cross section presented by either localised or global rule storage, and is the subject of future 
work. One possible CCA design for this pattern is shown in Figure 12 where the boundary cell 
values have been chosen such that 15 rules are required with no rule conflicts. Note that this 
design requires 3 bit lines between each cell in order to encode the states [0…6]. 
 
Figure 12 CCA pattern for full-adder logic design requiring 15 rules. 
 
4.4 Example design 
For the purposes of demonstration, the full adder logic design example detailed in Figure 3 
may be implemented in hardware description language (HDL) and used to create the 
architecture shown Figure 13. In this example, each design cell contains both the fault-tolerant 
coordination and respective functional component logic cell along with the necessary LUTs. 
Hence each cell contains the superimposed equivalent of the two-layer design illustrated in 
Figure 2. While COTS FPGAs are not optimised for efficient implementations of such designs, 
they serve as a useful platform for functional verification and hardware fault emulation. In this 
example a Xilinx Vertex 5 was used and a VHDL description of each cell containing rule and 
state mapping LUTs was synthesised/mapped to a configuration bitstream. A hardware-in-loop 
interface can then be used to verify the logic configuration and functionality under SEU/MBU 
fault conditions. An example of a fault test is illustrated in Figure 14, in which an injected fault 
produces error states that are removed by the regenerative action of the CCA. 
 Figure 13 Schematic cellular design concept. This example shows a 4x4 cell array in which each cell 
contains both a CCA and respective functional logic cell.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 14 Example of recovery from fault injection in a 4x4 CCA. Incorrect internal state is injected into a 
single cell as indicated, followed by pattern restoration after 5 successive iterations of the rule set. 
Boundary cells (=0) are shaded and incorrect output cells are hatched. 
 
4.5 Fault detection 
An interesting prospect of this implementation is that fault monitoring is possible within 
certain design combinations by monitoring the behaviour of output boundary cells disposed 
along the bottom-most row and right-most column of the CCA. These are referred as output 
cells. When an incorrect state occurs, fault information is propagated to the output cells via 
deviations from their intended states. This property may be exploited to produce signals that 
indicate the occurrences of SEUs within the main body of the CCA and that may be exploited as 
an additional feature beyond self-restoration. Note that the absolute state of the output 
boundary cells need not be known a priori - only the knowledge that their state has been 
altered is required. This is may be useful in situations where self-recovery is not by itself 
sufficient, and where a logging of upset events is useful for long-term monitoring. 
An example of a fault sensitive design is illustrated in Figure 15 for a 4x4 target pattern. In this 
design, the input boundary cells are all set to the value ‘0’, thus forcing the creation of 
additional states within the pattern matrix during rule generation. The design requires 15 rules 
and 7 state mappings. Although the rule and state mapping resource requirement could be 
reduced by increasing the complexity of the input boundary cell values, this would reduce 
sensitivity to faults. The introduction of additional rules and state values increases the 
likelihood that a fault will change one or more output cell. In this example a fault is assumed to 
create the stuck-at value of ‘2’ and the CCA exhibits a change in its output cells as a result. A 
sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing the location of the stuck-at fault and checking 
for a change in the output boundary cells. The results, summarised in Table 4. show that, with 
one exception, at least one output cell event manifests for every fault location. An exception is 
when the fault is located at cell (4,2) where stuck-at value is equal to the correct cell value.  
 Figure 15 Example of stuck at fault occurring at cell (2,2) and resulting alteration of output boundary cell 
values. Stuck at fault crate the cell value ‘2’. 
 
Table 4 Fault analysis for stuck at fault value of ‘2’. (‘Sum’ = sum of output cell values. ‘Diff’ = difference 
non-faulty condition i.e., when ‘Sum’ = 8). Fault recognition occurs when the condition ‘Diff’ > 0 is met. 
Fault 
location 
No 
fault 
2,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,5 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 
Sum 8 24 11 17 10 12 17 9 10 8 15 6 10 7 11 5 10 
Diff 0 16 3 8 2 4 9 1 2 0 7 2 2 1 3 3 2 
 
The above result is somewhat restricted to specific design cases because sensitivity is not 
guaranteed for all stuck-at values nor for all CCA patterns. However the likelihood of fault 
detection is increased by implementing a larger state LUT (at the cost of higher resource 
overhead).  
5 Design and manufacturing considerations 
Referring again to Figure 3, the number of state LUT entries determines the number of logic 
cell configurations and hence the resource overhead of the functional component layer. The 
size of the respective rule LUT is determined by the efficiency of the rule and state mapping 
algorithm. Hence efficient coding of the CCA rule/state LUTs is critical to minimise logic 
overhead since each LUT is stored within every cell.  
It is worth pointing out that the central goal of our approach is that, provided the CCA rule 
LUTs are preserved, the design is made highly resilient to transient faults occurring within the 
CCA cell states (i.e., the state of the coordination layer) and therefore within the functional 
component configuration. However, the hardware memory LUT and sequential logic 
associated with each cell of the CCA may also be sensitive to SEU and/or MBU. For the 
purposes of this study, it has been assumed that the CCA rule LUTs are fixed and do not 
contain errors and for example, may be implemented as ROM tables that are relatively 
insensitive to SEE. Programmable designs do however require RAM blocks, in which case it is 
clear that further protection by EDC would be advisable to protect against corruption of the 
LUTs. Since each CCA cell uses identical rule and state LUTs, an efficient design variation would 
involve clustering of LUTs shared among multiple cells each protected by EDC as was discussed 
in Section 4.3. 
Design flexibility may be traded for reduced resource overhead in some cases by relaxing 
restrictions on signal flow direction, thus permitting the use of combined logic blocks that 
include overlapping signal routing. This would afford a greater compression of the design 
through abstraction between coordination and logic layers at the expense of more complex 
intra-cell routing. A similar effect is observed in current FPGA chips, where interconnect 
accounts for a high proportion of chip area and power consumption. An example of this 
approach is illustrated in Figure 16, in which a full adder design is arranged as two cascaded 
half adders, an OR block and a routing block. Clearly this approach delegates more complex 
logic cell configurations than the example shown in Figure 3 and therefore has reduced the 
scope for both design reuse and fault detection. However both interconnect density and CCA 
size are greatly reduced. 
 
Figure 16 Simplified adder design using half-adder blocks (a), requiring 3 rules (b). 
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
A self-configuring strategy was presented that increases the resilience of electronic systems 
against SEU and MBU. The approach taken protects functional logic configurations and is thus 
considered to be complementary to existing hardware design techniques already employed for 
cost reduction of through-life maintenance of complex systems. From the exhaustive target 
pattern investigation presented in Section 4, 15the number of required CCA states, rules and 
state mappings is strongly dependent upon the chosen boundary conditions. This study is 
restricted to binary target patterns since all digital logic implementations are ultimately 
implemented as binary-encoded designs. Although reductions in the size of the rule and state 
LUTs are possible by judicious choice of boundary cell values, there are limitations: first, the 
rule set is not readily compressible since it reflects the complexity of the pattern and its 
encoding in the form of rules. Second, a reduction of the number of cell states does not 
immediately result in fewer intra-cell interconnects. This is due to the fact that those pattern 
cells abutting boundary cells must be able to address at least one boundary value in their LUT, 
requiring additional data lines. Further work is needed to determine the most effective 
method for self-checking of rule and state LUTs, either at the cellular level or else by using 
clustered LUTs. The hardware test bench test system described in Section 4.4 confirms that 
functional operation of the approach, but further evaluation requires custom logic design.  
The strategy is well-suited to the protection of data patterns stored in memory for finite state 
machine logic and configuration bitstreams for configurable logic. The distributions observed 
in the 4x4 pattern analysis showed Gaussian-type properties for the numbers of states and 
state mappings, and a biased trend for the number of rules, which may be useful for predicting 
the resource requirements for larger data patterns that cannot be studied by the same 
exhaustive procedure. It should be noted that a further trade-off exists between LUT size and 
fault detection capability. Furthermore, for some applications a more favourable compromise 
may be found by using standard EDC deployed in regions that are vulnerable to SEU. However 
the self-restoring strategy presented here is beneficial for cases where application is sensitive 
to MBU, where fault detection/localisation is advantageous and when self-initiated restoration 
is compatible with the application. 
The handling of permanent errors (e.g., transistor burnout or latch up) caused by degradation 
or extreme environmental conditions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, assuming 
that a faulty cell may be uniquely identified, possible mitigation strategies include diverting 
inter-cell I/O lines to a spare cell (incurring a high interconnect resource overhead) or 
implementing entire rows or columns of spare cells used to replace any row or column 
containing faulty cells. These techniques pose a major challenge because dynamic CA rules are 
then needed in order to alter the CA reconfiguration. Genetic algorithms are capable of 
adapting to permanent faults occurring in configurable logic but require global computing 
resources and may exhibit unbounded repair time. In contrast CCA rule sets are computed 
deterministically and their recovery time is bounded. The through-life care of future 
engineering systems will depend on a combination of both permanent and transient fault 
mitigation strategies. 
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